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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMAGINARY:  
JUST STORIES ABOUT WE THE PEOPLE 
GERALD TORRES
∗ & LANI GUINIER
**
To live in a legal world requires that one know not only the precepts, 
but also their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs.  
It requires that one integrate not only the ‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ but the 
‘is,’ the ‘ought,’ and the ‘what might be.’ 
 
1
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In his new book, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Un-
just World, Jack Balkin suggests that the continued vitality of the Amer-
ican project relies on redeeming our constitutional faith.
2  To have 
constitutional faith is, for Professor Balkin, to have faith in the possi-
bility of a just constitutional politics in an obdurately unjust world.
3  
He tells stories about how we constitute ourselves and about the 
struggle over constitutional meaning.
4  The tug and pull of those sto-
ries is reminiscent of the exchange between Rousseau (“Man is born 
free; and everywhere he is in chains”
5) and de Maistre (“Fish were 
born to fly, but everywhere they swim”
6).  Balkin is firmly with Rous-
seau both in spirit and in understanding that the basic task of every 
political system is to legitimate the exercise of power.
7
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  1.  Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1983). 
  2.  JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 2 (2011). 
  3.  Id. at 16. 
  4.  Id. at 17–32. 
  5.  JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 3 (G. D. H. Cole 
trans., 1950). 
  6.  This was Joseph de Maistre’s response to the first sentence of Rousseau’s Social Con-
tract  and was famously quoted by Alexander Herzen.  ALEXANDER  HERZEN,  FROM THE 
OTHER SHORE AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND SOCIALISM 108 (M. Budberg & R. Wollheim 
trans., 1956); Aileen Kelly, The Destruction of Idols: Alexander Herzen and Francis Bacon, 41 J. 
HIST. IDEAS 635, 652 & n.20 (1980). 
  7.  BALKIN, supra note 2, at 34–35.  
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Professor Balkin wants to redeem originalism by yoking the task 
of interpreting the Constitution to a framework that (1) compels feal-
ty to rules at the same time it (2) looks to the past for a vision of the 
future.
8  But, like others before him, Balkin has to provide a view that 
is faithful to the constitutional vision that is not dictated by rules as 
well as to the part of our original Constitution that denied women the 
right to vote and counted blacks as only three-fifths of a person.
9  He 
has to tell a story of constitutional conflict that is consistent with the 
original governing vision but in which the conflict is really about what 
type  of future governing  people want.
10  Like Professor Charles L. 
Black, Jr., Professor Balkin locates our founding legal document not 
in the Constitution of 1789 but in the Declaration of Independence 
of 1776.
11  There are, of course, other constituting documents, the 
Northwest Ordinance
12 and the Trade and Intercourse Act,
13
 
  8.  Id. at 228–35.  Originalism is generally understood as a commitment to interpret 
the text of the Constitution based on its meaning at the time the document was written 
and ratified. The source of that commitment (for example, of finding the original mean-
ing of the Constitution and interpreting it consistent with the views of those who drafted 
and ratified it) is the belief that the duty of the judiciary is to uphold the existing law, not 
to amend or repeal it unless it is clearly wrong and the standards for judging rightness or 
wrongness come from the original documents.  This understanding of fidelity to the origi-
nal meaning is generally associated with conservative judges such as Justices Antonin Scalia 
and Clarence Thomas.  It is the conservative counternarrative to the liberal idea of a “liv-
ing Constitution,” meaning a document whose meaning evolves over time.  Id. at 226–28. 
 for ex-
ample, but those statutes merely highlight the importance of the Dec-
laration of Independence.  The formal Constitution and the other 
constituting statutes form the operating system for governance, but 
  9.  See  id.  at 227–28 (noting the difficulties of adhering to a pure originalist view-
point). 
  10.  See id. at 228–35 (discussing “framework originalism,” which argues that the Consti-
tution’s framework is fixed in place). 
  11.  See id. at 18 (“It is the eventual redemption in history of the principles of our 
founding document. I do not mean the written Constitution of 1787. I mean the Declara-
tion of Independence of 1776.”); CHARLES  L.  BLACK,  JR.,  A  NEW  BIRTH OF FREEDOM: 
HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED, at x (1997) (“[O]nce one takes courage from 
[Lincoln’s] recognition of the primacy of the Declaration of Independence, the rest falls 
easily into place.”).  See also J. DAVID GREENSTONE, THE LINCOLN PERSUASION, REMAKING 
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 282 (1993) (“For [Lincoln], the declaration was not simply a ra-
tional statement of universal truths about the natural rights of particular individuals—it 
also proclaimed his nation’s covenantal status as a special people”); Ken I. Kersch, Beyond 
Originalism: Conservative Declarationism and Constitutional Redemption, 71 MD. L. REV. 229, 
229–30 (2011) (describing the uses of Declarationism, which holds that the Constitution 
can only be understood in light of the principles announced in the Declaration, within the 
modern conservative movement). 
  12.  Northwest Ordinance (July 13, 1787), ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789). 
  13.  Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 137–38 (1790).  
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the values and principles contained in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence tell us whether governance is legitimate.
14
Professor Balkin sketches out a constitutional imaginary by tell-
ing stories about how we came to be a people.
 
15  By a people he 
means that we are bound together in ways that inform our under-
standing of the goals of constitutional law and politics.
16  The consti-
tutional imaginary is composed of those sets of values and institutions 
comprising the empirical and symbolic aspects of our social life.
17  
This imaginary gives us a way of understanding the social world and 
our place in it.
18  Our collective life is governed in important ways 
through this process.
19  As John Searle put it, “[T]he complex struc-
ture of social reality is, so to speak, weightless and invisible.  The child 
is brought up in a culture where he or she simply takes social reality 
for granted. . . .  The complex ontology seems simple . . . .”
20
What Professor Balkin attempts to do is to make the invisible vis-
ible in order to make the contests over meaning plain and to locate 
constitutional doctrine within this conflict-ridden domain.
  
21  He con-
cedes that this is not the normal territory of constitutional theory, but 
he suggests it is necessary to illuminate the work that theory does.
22
For Balkin, the critical work that his theory does is to “bridge[] 
the gap between laypersons and legal professionals.”
  
23  His theory, 
what he calls “framework originalism,” is thus a leveling device that 
opens the playing field equally to ordinary citizens and the legal 
elite.
24  Each group, in Balkin’s view, should have equal access to “the 
Constitution’s text and principles.”
25  Laypersons as well as legal pro-
fessionals should enjoy the same opportunity to make appeals by re-
turning to the actual language of the Constitution, but also by rein-
terpreting its larger constitutive meaning.
26
 
  14.  See  BALKIN,  supra  note 
 
2, at 19 (“Without [the Declaration of Independence’s] 
ideals our written Constitution would be an empty shell . . . .”). 
  15.  Id. at 3. 
  16.  Id. 
  17.  Id. at 3, 239. 
  18.  Id. at 3–4, 239. 
  19.  Id. at 3–4. 
  20.  JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 4 (1995). 
  21.  BALKIN, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
  22.  Id. 
  23.  Id. at 238. 
  24.  Id. 
  25.  Id. 
  26.  Id. at 237–40.  
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We admire Professor Balkin’s project to create a “redemptive 
narrative framework” and his effort to encourage popular ownership 
of the Constitution’s text.
27  It is as important to us, as it is to Balkin, 
that We the People see the Constitution as “our Constitution.”
28  Indeed, 
our own writings on “demosprudence” suggest the importance of ac-
knowledging the interpretive function of social movements and other 
lay actors in developing constitutional jurisprudence.
29  Like Mark 
Tushnet’s defense of popular constitutionalism,
30 or Reva Siegel and 
Robert Post’s “democratic constitutionalism,”
31  the goal of demo-
sprudence is to engage the members of the polity “to consider, criti-
que, and even take action in response to decisions with which they 
disagree.”
32  While the legislature is the formal representative body, 
demosprudence reminds us that it is the people themselves who give 
democracy its legitimacy.
33
We also agree with Balkin’s effort to expand the universe of what 
constitutes the “framework” of our Constitution.  We would, however, 
include Lincoln’s First Inaugural,
 
34 not just his Second Inaugural and 
the Civil War Amendments, as redemptive documents in the constitu-
tional canon.
35
 
  27.  See Aziz Rana, Freedom Struggles and the Limits of Constitutional Continuity, 71 MD. L. 
REV. 1015, 1020 (2012).  
  In the Civil War, the sacrifice was real and the concep-
  28.  BALKIN, supra note 2, at 237. 
  29.  See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 115–22 
(2008) (noting the power of the public when it is encouraged to discuss and critique Su-
preme Court decisions and other issues relevant to the democratic process and providing 
several case studies); Gerald Torres, Social Movements and the Ethical Construction of Law, 37 
CAP. U. L. REV. 535, 559 (2009) (suggesting that social movements, such as those during 
the era of desegregation, contributed to the changing of people’s understanding of the 
role of government). 
  30.  MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181 (1999).  
In Tushnet’s words, “the Constitution belongs to us collectively, as we act together.”  Id. (em-
phasis added).  
  31.  See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Back-
lash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 379 (2007) (noting that “democratic constitutional-
ism” recognizes the importance of the public in “guiding” judicial review); Reva Siegel, 
Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 193–
94 (2008) (noting that “democratic constitutionalism” is when “[t]he effort to persuade—
and to capture institutions that can authoritatively pronounce law—can prompt mobiliza-
tion, countermobilization, coalition, and compromise, a process that can forge and discip-
line new understandings that courts engaged in responsive interpretation recognize as the 
Constitution”). 
  32.  Guinier, supra note 29, at 115. 
  33.  Id. 
  34.  “This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it.”  Abraham 
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1908, at 5, 10 (James D. Richardson ed., 1908). 
  35.  Lincoln concluded his Second Inaugural by stating:   
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tual seal that held back the full truths of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence’s promise was broken.
36
At the same time, we question Balkin’s idea that redemption is 
ultimately what is at stake.  Balkin seems to presuppose a story about 
our founding that we think is ultimately more problematic than sus-
tainable, especially given Balkin’s larger goals.
  
37  The need, in our 
view, is not for a redemptive cleansing.  What is required is a promise 
of redistribution that the Civil War-era documents called for in order 
to bring the ringing statements in the Declaration of Independence 
up to date.
38
Our argument proceeds as follows: In Part II we discuss the Con-
stitution as the Story of Us.  In Part III.A we question Balkin’s claim 
that the Story of Us is about redemption.  The religious content of the 
ideas of redemption and faith is somewhat misleading because it is 
not religion that we need.  It is politics.  Professor Balkin knows this,
  
39
 
    Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may 
speedily pass away.  Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by 
the bond-man’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and 
until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn 
with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said “the 
judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.” 
 
but the confusion—about what kind of hermeneutics is necessary—
shifts the focus in important ways.  One of the most important ways in 
which it shifts is the subject of Part III.B, where we focus on the im-
portant role that social movement activism plays as a source of law 
and as an important locus of political legitimacy.  
    With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as 
God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind 
up the nation’s wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for 
his widow and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and 
lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations. 
Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865) in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1908, at 276–77 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1908). 
  36.  See Torres, supra note 29, at 542–43 (observing that the Civil War Amendments, 
which were codified as a result of social changes after the Civil War, altered the impact of 
the Constitution on society). 
  37.  See, e.g., Rana, supra note 27, at 1051.  
  38.  See William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution, 22 DEMOCRACY J. 72, 76 (2011), 
available at  http://www.democracyjournal.org/22/the-distributive-constitution.php (not-
ing that since the Civil War, the Constitution has “promise[d] real equality of opportunity” 
for all citizens and “calls on all three branches of the national government to ensure that 
all Americans enjoy a decent education and livelihood”).  
  39.  See  BALKIN,  supra  note  2, at 33 (acknowledging that the state’s legitimacy is “a 
property of an entire political and legal system”).  
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II.    THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMAGINARY: THE CONSTITUTION AS THE 
STORY OF US  
In his work on political organizing, sociologist Marshall Ganz 
stresses the importance of storytelling in mobilizing people to take 
risks in the service of a collective struggle.
40  There is no larger collec-
tive struggle than the making of a nation.  Ganz supplies the sociolog-
ical support for Balkin’s propositions by locating the importance of 
storytelling in the tradition of organizing.
41  In his work on public 
narrative, Ganz identifies three key moments in building a mobilizing 
story.  Those moments are establishing a “story of self,” when that sto-
ry of self becomes the “story of us,” and when the story of us is linked 
to the “story of now.”
42
The “story of self” is the account of your life that enables you to 
identify the sources of your own purpose.
 
43  The questions that this 
inquiry asks are: Why are you committed to the things you are?  What 
are the foundations of that commitment?  What were the important 
decisions you made that got you to where you are?  And why did you 
experience them as necessary moments of action or decision?
44  While 
this process may seem like an excuse for self-absorption, this exercise 
in the context of organizing is not just navel-gazing.  Its function is to 
create a way to form links to others in the service of creating a consti-
tuency, a group, a community.
45  This self-reflection enables you to 
identify common sources of meaning which facilitate your identifica-
tion with others and them with you.
46
The mutuality embedded in the telling of a story of self is found 
in the convergence of those stories into what Professor Ganz calls the 
“story of us,”
  This is especially true in those 
situations where the risks of linking fates together may be substantial. 
47
 
  40.  See Marshall Ganz, Leading Change: Leadership, Organization, and Social Movements, in 
HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE 515–17 (Nitrin Nohria & Rakesh Khu-
rana eds., 2010).   
 what Professor Balkin calls constitutive narratives, or sto-
ries of persuasion that locate the self in a complex network of social, 
  41.  See id. at 519–22. 
  42.  See id. at 522–27. 
  43.  See id. at 523–25. 
  44.  See id.  
  45.  See id. at 524 (“In the Civil Rights movement, blacks living in the Deep South who 
feared claiming the right to vote had to encourage one another to find the courage to 
make the claim—which, once made, began to alter how they thought of themselves and 
how they could interact with their children, as well as with white people, and each other.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
  46.  See id. 
  47.  Id. at 525–26.  
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political, and cultural relationships.
48  Because constitutive stories, in 
the way that Professor Balkin uses the concept, help define the mean-
ing of “we the people,”
49 moving from a micro account—like Ganz’s 
story of self
50—to a macro  account—like Balkin’s story of we the 
people
51
Law, and especially the Constitution, are the institutions that 
Balkin recurs to in order to resolve this tension.  Yet for legal purpos-
es there is only one story of us that matters doctrinally, even if doc-
trine is constantly under stress from explanations that are exogenous 
to the formal institutions of law and lawmaking.  The meta-narrative 
driving doctrine is the view that the political and the social are distinct 
realms separated by the institutions of civil society that police the lim-
its of legitimate state power.  Professor Ganz is aiming at organizing to 
challenge the public use of private power.  What Professor Balkin is 
describing is competition over the meta-narrative of the culture.
—presents troubling analytic problems.  Remember that 
Ganz is only trying to explain how a group can be formed and cohere.  
Balkin is asking a larger question: How do we move from a story of 
self to a story of us that is big enough to constitute a nation?  In a 
deeply  pluralist culture there are many stories of us, and weaving 
them into a coherent whole that does not do violence to the constitu-
ent parts is where the political action is.  The meta-story cannot rely 
simply on the rhetorical devices of ethnic solidarity or ethnic or racial 
nationalism that builds on a pre-existing cultural basis for intersubjec-
tive identification.  
52
A.  Just Stories  
  
Both are deeply political moments in the evolution of our culture.  
Both rely on the technology of storytelling, but Balkin reveals a far 
deeper faith in the possibility of meta-stories to drive individual con-
structions of the self into a coherent story of the nation. 
When narrating the story of us that justifies political faith in the 
Constitution, Professor Balkin is clear that he is not just telling con-
testable stories about our history; he is endeavoring to tell just sto-
 
  48.  See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 30–31 (suggesting that “constitutional narratives” allow 
Americans to identify themselves as one people with a shared destiny). 
  49.  See id. at 31. 
  50.  See Ganz, supra note 40, at 523–27. 
  51.  See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 31 (“The story of America’s rebellion against monarchy 
is our constitutional story.  It shapes our collective memory.  It tells us who we are.  It de-
fines us as We the People of the United States.”). 
  52.  See id. (arguing that constitutional narratives allow Americans to conceive of them-
selves “as part of a greater whole, collectively working toward the fulfillment of the prin-
ciples of the Declaration”).  
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ries.
53  The path to redemption, after all, is toward the reclamation of 
the promise of justice even if the horizon of its final realization is con-
stantly receding.
54
According to Professor Balkin’s account, the normative vision of 
the social and political elite determines what the legal elite might as-
sert as plausible formal doctrinal arguments.
  The unavoidable problem of telling just stories is 
that the issue of what constitutes justice, whether as an untethered 
normative commitment or as a limited legal construct called “consti-
tutional justice,” remains a contested idea in either case.  The differ-
ence arises in what constitutes legitimate objections to claims of jus-
tice.  So long as constitutional doctrine remains the anchor for these 
discussions and the operating system for governance, the grounds for 
legitimate political contestation remains highly constrained.  The im-
portant point to remember here is that it remains constrained by the 
normative visions of elites.  
55  Of course, he does not 
suggest that it is a one-way relationship, since a rupture in an under-
standing of the meaning of a particular line of legal doctrine reverbe-
rates through the culture and produces conflict that is both horizon-
tal and vertical.  At the same time, such a normative fracturing can 
shape new narratives of who we are.
56  It results even in changes in our 
understanding of the province of institutions like the social, the legal, 
the public, or the private.  The inherently political nature of that strug-
gle has a cultural dimension, but that is only because we are a culture 
that is rooted, according to Balkin, in legality.
57
The path to redemption is defined by the process of arguments 
that once were, as Balkin puts it, “off-the-wall,” and, as documented by 
Ganz, can, through the work of social movements, be put back “on 
 
 
  53.  See id. at 57–59 (“Americans tell their story of progress by identifying who was on 
the right path to progress . . . and who strayed or tried to hold us back.”). 
  54.  See id. at 142 (recognizing that the promise of constitutional redemption can never 
be fully realized). 
  55.  See id. at 223 (arguing that constitutional doctrine is often determined by “wheth-
er . . . influential persons and groups get behind a particular interpretation of the Consti-
tution and use their power to push it into public acceptance”). 
  56.  See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 
421, 429 (1960) (arguing that the segregation cases were justified by new normative argu-
ments that were powerful enough to “reconcile the white South to” the “mighty diastroph-
ic change” of mandatory desegregation).  
  57.  See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 23–25 (arguing that the goal of America’s constitution-
al order is to produce a democratic legal order which “inheres not only in procedural me-
chanisms like universal suffrage but in cultural modes like dress, language, manners, and 
behavior”).  Professor Balkin’s observation dates back at least to Alexis de Tocqueville.  See 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,  DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA  275–77 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 
Library of America 2004) (1835) (discussing the deeply rooted respect and affection for 
law in America).  
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the wall.”  But, for Balkin, these arguments become “on-the-wall”
58 
without turning away from the reality of the possibility of constitu-
tional evil.
59  Constitutional faith resides in the belief that this process 
redeems the promise of justice that is located in our founding legal 
documents.
60  Those documents outlined the political project that is 
America.  Thus a clear-eyed assessment of the possibilities contained 
within those documents forms the grounds on which the constitutive 
stories of us are constructed.
61
B.  Imagined Redemption: Confronting Constitutional Evil 
  The faith resides in the belief that res-
olution of conflicts over the evolving meaning of contested abstrac-
tions is always temporary.  Or said more plainly, despite current un-
derstandings, the future can always be remade. 
Here is another story:  
  The disease that Reagan brought into the American mind 
was like the terrifying shadow the patient sees in X-rays 
clipped to a light box.  It came from nowhere and appeared 
in the body of the country.  There is a magic quality to the 
decline of men and democracies.  Historians . . . study the 
tissue, identify markers, but only after the decline has begun 
can they do their work.  No doctor, for all that she might 
wish to heal the heart or soul, can predict the onset of the 
fouling of the tiniest part.  One cell must be the first to sick-
en and then sicken another.  The beginning is the mag-
ic . . . . 
  Aristotle said that the political body is nourished by ethics, 
but he did not persuade me that a lack of ethics would bring 
down the darkness over the grand American experiment.  I 
thought that a democracy so blessed, so brilliant, could sur-
vive without ethics . . . . 
  I have wished for many years to be a physician to my be-
loved country.  The means to care for it is clear.  I was re-
vived by love and ethics.  And I am not unique: no man, no 
woman is a metaphor; that is the place of gods.  I do not 
know who will take America in their arms to revive her. 
 
  58.  See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 179–82 (describing the “on-the-wall” and “off-the-wall” 
concepts). 
  59.  Id.  
  60.  See id. at 79–80, 101–02 (discussing constitutional faith). 
  61.  Id. at 30–32 (describing the constitutional stories of “the people”).  
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  No nation is forever.
62
A despairing story to be sure, but one rooted not just in the re-
collections of a dying man in 2011, old and at the end of his life, but 
in Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign kickoff at the Neshoba 
County Fair in Mississippi some thirty years earlier.
 
63  Reagan’s casual 
insult to the memory of Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and 
James Chaney—failing to mention their sacrifice in a speech so close 
to the site of their killing—could hardly have been unintentional.
64  
Instead, it was part of the discourse of the end of the second recon-
struction.  Or as Jacquelyn Dowd Hall argues in her essay The Long 
Civil Rights Movement, “The civil rights movement circulates through 
American memory in forms and through channels that are at once 
powerful, dangerous, and hotly contested.  Civil rights memorials 
[continue to] jostle with the South’s ubiquitous monuments to its 
Confederate past.”
65
There are reasons to be hopeful, but reasons, as well, to credit 
the story Earl Shorris tells.  If the struggle is over the narrative of the 
course of our history, then the nature of the political conflicts within 
which that narrative has to make sense is critical.  The conflicts can be 
over local struggles for power and control within the structure of po-
litical authority (and the monopoly over legitimate violence) or they 
  Thus, just as the end of the original Reconstruc-
tion gave a long and painful birth to the second, the question of re-
demption is a question about the possibility of American political cul-
ture giving birth to the third reconstruction. 
 
  62.  Earl Shorris, American Vespers: The Ebbing of the Body Politic, 323 HARPER’S MAGAZINE 
62, 67 (December 2011).  
  63.  See Ronald Reagan, Presidential Candidate, Neshoba County Fair Speech (Aug. 3, 
1980) (transcript available at http://neshobademocrat.com/main.asp?SectionID=2&Sub-
SectionID=297&ArticleID=15599&TM=60417.67).  Ronald Reagan’s speech on August 3, 
1980, at the Neshoba County Fair in Mississippi was his first public address after the Re-
publican National Convention chose him as its presidential nominee.  That Reagan was 
still using the language of “state’s rights” in 1980 reinforces Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s argu-
ment in The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233 
(2005).  Hall argues that the civil rights movement’s trajectory stretched well before and 
then well beyond the decade of the 1960s.  Id. at 1236 & n.8.  “By confining the civil rights 
struggle to the South . . . to a single halcyon decade, and to limited, noneconomic objec-
tives, the master narrative simultaneously elevates and diminishes the movement[.]”  Id. at 
1234.  Hall continues, “It ensures the status of the classical phase as a triumphal moment 
in a larger American progress narrative, yet it undermines its gravitas.  It prevents one of 
the most remarkable mass movements in American history from speaking effectively to the 
challenges of our time.”  Id. 
  64.  See Shorris, supra note 62, at 67 (critiquing how then-presidential candidate Reagan 
did not mention the murders of three civil rights activists in his Neshoba County, Missis-
sippi, speech, which took place near where the murders occurred). 
  65.  Hall, supra note 63, at 1233.  
1062  MARYLAND LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 71:1052 
can be more fundamental, like the meaning or history of the nature 
of human society.  For faith to be warranted, Balkin has to reconcile 
two different belief systems.  On the one hand, there is the belief of 
traditional conservatives in the priority of society (the received tradi-
tion within which we construct our lives) and with it the need to pre-
serve traditional institutions which we hold as trustees.
66  On the other 
hand, there is the classical liberal belief in the priority of the individ-
ual and with it the belief in our ability to remake any institution that 
inhibits the flowering of human freedom.
67
In some sense everyone is a “liberal” today.  The difference lies in 
the ideas about what the government may legitimately do.  To con-
servatives, to restructure social institutions in a way that does violence 
to received tradition can be no guarantee of individual flourishing.
   
68  
The contemporary liberal position suggests that obeisance to tradition 
is not a value in itself, but only justified in the service of greater indi-
vidual freedom.
69  That our constituting documents put us in the 
middle of that intellectual and ideological conflict is exactly what Bal-
kin suggests, and his turn to originalism can be understood as a way to 
redeem both traditions: the conservative obligation to preserve that 
which we have inherited and the liberal obligation to demand tran-
scendent principles before individual liberty can be abridged.
70  Libe-
ralism contains the correlative moral obligation to change those insti-
tutions that restrain our individual capacity to define and live the 
good as we see it.
71
 
  66.  See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 107 (Lon-
don, MacMillan & Co. 1890) (“Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts, for ob-
jects of mere occasional interest, may be dissolved at pleasure; but the state ought not to 
be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and 
coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little tem-
porary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties.”). 
 
  67.  See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 13 (1991) (noting the 
“traditional liberal concern for civil and personal liberties”).  
  68.  See generally THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED (1995) (critiquing so-
cial policies from the 1960s through the 1990s). 
  69.  Cf. KYMLICKA, supra note 67, at 254 (“Liberal individualism is grounded in this ir-
reducible commitment to the role of individual self-direction and responsibility in a just 
community, and to the principle of moral equality which underlies both.”).  
  70.  See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 226–28 (comparing the two schools of thought for 
American constitutional interpretation—“living constitutionalism” and “originalism”—and 
their central themes). 
  71.  See KYMLICKA, supra note 67, at 2–3 (“The individualism that underlies liberalism 
isn’t valued at the expense of our social nature or shared community.  It is an individual-
ism that accords with, rather than opposes, the undeniable importance to us of our social 
world.”).   
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The breakdown in our politics, and its consequences for the law 
that Balkin is responding to, does reflect a loss of faith in both the 
broadly liberal project to maximize individual freedom and our ca-
pacity to reconstitute those social institutions which constrain that ca-
pacity for liberty.  What Balkin is trying to map is the relationship be-
tween an operating system of governance that located democratic 
legitimacy in the free expression of individual actors to choose their 
own government and an obdurate network of social institutions that 
declared some and perhaps the most important constraints on indi-
vidual liberty as politically off-limits.
72
Like a cartographer looking through old maps, Balkin sees 
landmarks are changed; new cities and roads appear, but the basic to-
pography remains the same.  His originalism is recognition that while 
we must make new maps, all of the changes are based on new infor-
mation and new formations that are fundamentally social, but they 
are only written on the slowly changing land.  Over time we under-
stand the landscape as natural, but, of course, it would be unintelligi-
ble without our knowledge of each other.  Balkin’s rules, standards, 
and principles are the measures and directions the cartographers use.  
Some features are fixed, but all of the rest are contingent.
  
73  At the 
same time, the map that the contemporary cartographer draws must 
not be one-dimensional.  The Constitution, in other words, has to be 
understood as both a text and a practice.
74
 
  72.  See BALKIN, supra note 
  As we shall argue in the 
next Part, faith in the Constitution has to be faith in the possibility of 
citizen participation in an ongoing set of institutions. 
2, at 36 (“[W]hat makes the American constitutional order 
respect-worthy is its substantive content: the procedures it offers for political decisionmak-
ing, the rights it recognizes, the limits on government action it imposes, and so on.  A con-
stitutional order is worthy of respect because it has the right content and reasonable 
people can agree to live under it because of that content.”). 
  73.  See id. at 226, 228 (explaining that to an originalist “some aspect or feature of the 
Constitution is fixed when the Constitution is adopted” but that, under the author’s view 
of the “best form of originalism,” the theory “complements the processes of growth and 
adaptation” embraced by the “living constitutionalism” school of thought). 
  74.  See id. at 40 (“[W]e cannot really model the legitimacy of the Constitution (and the 
related practice of judicial review) on a simple version of a contract . . . .  Although the 
Constitution may look like an agreement among We the People, it does not actually oper-
ate as a quid pro quo . . . .  We find out what the Constitution-in-practice means only later 
on after we are already in the game.”).  
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III.  SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERSTANDING 
A.  It Is Not Religion That We Need.  It Is Politics.  
The hope of Professor Balkin’s intervention is that “framework 
originalism” will open up contested space, and thus offer the possibili-
ty of “constitutional redemption.”
75  Redemption comes because the 
text in framework originalism “provides a common [interpretative] 
framework,” one that is tied to “protestant constitutionalism.”
76  In 
protestant constitutionalism, the Constitution itself, not the interpre-
tations given it by judges or lawyers, is the primary source of govern-
ing authority.
77  Thus, all members of the polity, not just judges and 
lawyers, share in the capacity to interpret its meaning.
78  Whether it is 
atonement or deliverance that needs to happen, Balkin’s theory of 
change makes protestant constitutionalism a weapon of dissent, a 
pledge of faith, and a tool of redemption.
79
At the same time, Balkin’s use of religious iconography, relying 
heavily on words such as redemption and faith, suggests that the Con-
stitution and what it means is a function of belief.
 
80  Belief alone, 
however, does not assure change.  We can all speak constitutional 
truth, but the only constitutional truth that matters is that which is 
backed by power.  For example, Aziz Rana examines judicial interpre-
tation of constitutional power during the Civil War.
81  Rana, too, is 
skeptical of redemptive constitutionalism “as the privileged path to re-
demption.”
82
 
  75.  Id. at 232. 
  Rana’s post-Civil War case studies show that the “politi-
  76.  Id.  
  77.  See id. at 235 (describing protestant constitutionalism as “the ability of ordinary cit-
izens to claim the Constitution as their Constitution, to assert in public what they believe it 
truly means, to organize in civil society and in politics and persuade others of their views”). 
  78.  See id. (“Living constitutionalism depends heavily on these forms of protestant con-
stitutionalism: the Constitution adapts to changing circumstances not simply through ad-
justments by bureaucrats and professional elites but also through successive waves of con-
stitutional dissent and disagreement in politics and civil society.”). 
  79.  See id. at 232 (suggesting that when originalism and protestant constitutionalism 
are combined, the resulting theory can become a “weapon of dissent . . . pledg[ing] faith 
in the future redemption of the Constitution”); see also id. at 235 (“By making protestant 
constitutional arguments, individuals and groups can turn claims that were once marginal 
or off-the-wall into accepted views, or at the very least influence future constitutional de-
velopment.”). 
  80.  See id. at 237 (“Because We the People have ordained and established the Constitu-
tion, it is ours.”). 
  81.  Rana, supra note 27, at 1026–45. 
  82.  See id. at 1026 (“Indeed, the lesson for progressives might be to deemphasize con-
stitutional faith and to develop more politically instrumental approaches to the value of 
constitutionalism.”).    
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cal effect” during Reconstruction of maintaining faith in the “discur-
sive capacity” of the Constitution was not liberatory.
83  Rather, in Ra-
na’s words, the Constitution was used to “provide a straitjacket for so-
cial transformation.”
84  Rana concludes that after the Civil War “the 
best—and perhaps only—means to redemption was through discre-
tionary and, if need be, extra-legal political action.”
85
Balkin understands the importance of power and the role social 
movements play in developing new sources of power.
 
86  Yet he never 
really tells us how protestant constitutionalism—his democratizing 
theory of constitutional faith—will generate a durable source of pow-
er, a power strong enough to overcome the views of the ruling elite.
87  
He acknowledges that how the interpretive space is occupied and 
contested, by whom, and for what purpose, makes all the difference.
88  
And his iconography depends on a constitutional politic that is not 
the sole province of a professional legal elite.
89
For Balkin, constitutional faith becomes a redemptive force that 
will somehow be backed by a more robust form of constitutional poli-
tics.
  But what he never re-
ally develops is the process by which political mobilization makes con-
stitutional change happen.   
90
 
  83.  Id. at 1030. 
  What he fails to explain, however, is how faith alone will ac-
complish such a power shift—a shift that is essential to ensure that 
constitutional interpretation becomes a project shaped by ordinary 
citizens.  Balkin leaves unsaid the mechanism by which his constitu-
  84.  Id. at 1045.  
  85.  Id.  
  86.  See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 63 (“[S]ocial movement contestation . . . attempts to 
change attitudes (especially elite attitudes) about what the Constitution means, and hence 
influences judicial decisionmaking, because judges are largely drawn from elites.”). 
  87.  See id. at 102 (stating that “the most basic problem of jurisprudence is the problem 
of faith in law; and the most basic question in jurisprudence is the question to what extent 
our faith in law is justified.  At the heart of law, and the philosophy of law, lies the problem 
of faith and idolatry.”); see also id. at 63 (expressing concern that “[i]n real life, some per-
sons [such as Supreme Court Justices] have disproportionate influence on the develop-
ment of constitutional norms, while most people have far less”). 
  88.  See id. at 10 (“People must be able to disagree with, denounce, and protest the 
Constitution-in-practice . . . so that they can help move the Constitution-in-practice toward 
arrangements that are closer to their ideals.”). 
  89.  See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
  90.  See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 10 (“We must have faith that through the thrust and 
parry of constitutional politics, through waves of mobilizations and countermobilizations 
speaking in the name of the Constitution, our Constitution can be restored or redeemed 
over time to better approach our ideals.”).  
1066  MARYLAND LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 71:1052 
tional protestantism will guarantee that those other than legal elites 
will enjoy the ability to interpret and reimagine the Constitution.
91
Balkin’s description of constitutional faith is compelling, but in 
our view what is most important is faith in the capacity of political 
struggle to lead us to imagine and construct a future into which the 
liberatory ideals of our framework documents can be rooted.  As Fre-
derick Douglass famously said, “If there is no struggle there is no 
progress” because “[p]ower concedes nothing without a demand.”
 
92
B.  Social Movement Activism as a Source of Law: The “Is,” the “Ought,” 
and the “What Might Be” 
  
But, for Douglass, progress meant looking to the future, not to the 
past, by bridging the gap between lay persons and elites in the wield-
ing of power. 
For us, what is missing from Balkin’s protestant constitutionalism 
is a convincing account of where social movement power is located, 
and thus how social movements become a source of law.  Balkin iden-
tifies the important role that “we the people” play in constitutional 
meaning-making,
93
Instead of extracting his vision from a mix of concrete case stu-
dies, Balkin resorts to a list of competing forces that help create and 
recreate what Robert Post would call “constitutional culture,” that is, 
the beliefs and constitutional values of nonjudicial actors.
 but rarely do we hear the ideas or the voices of the 
people speaking for themselves.  Members of what Balkin calls the po-
litical community participate in the construction of the “constitution-
al imaginary,” but surely the elite who dominate that community can-
not be the sole source of the muscle and connective tissue that binds 
the body politic together.  
94
 
  91.  Cf. Rana, supra note 
  Included 
27, at 1051 (“A tragic sensibility demands of progressives both 
that they aggressively assert emancipatory commitments and that they embrace a judicious 
political ethics.  Ultimately, it imagines an orientation to collective life animated by justice 
but tempered by the recognition of indissoluble paradox.”). 
  92.  Frederick Douglass, Speech Before the West Indian Emancipation Society (Aug. 4, 
1857), in 2 PHILIP S. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 437 (1950).    
  93.  See supra note 80. 
  94.  BALKIN, supra note 2, at 178–79, 272 n.27 (citing Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 
2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 8 (2003)).  Balkin notes that Robert Post “distinguishes between the views of au-
thoritative interpreters [of the law], which [Post] calls constitutional law, and the views of 
nonjudicial actors (including both professionals and nonprofessional), which he calls con-
stitutional culture.”  Id.  Post also asserted that “the legitimacy of constitutional law de-
pends in part upon what extrajudicial actors explicitly believe about the Constitution.”  
Post, supra, at 9.  But Balkin does not adopt Post’s definition in its entirety; instead, he 
crafts his own definition.  See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 178 (“A constitutional culture . . . is a  
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in Balkin’s list of what sustains—and potentially perturbs—a constitu-
tional culture are those who by virtue of their social networks, associa-
tions, and important institutional affiliations “produce a new equili-
brium featuring a new constitutional common sense.”
95  While the 
lawyers and judges formally construct the law, lay actors can also in-
fluence how the law is interpreted, enforced, or in fact popularly un-
derstood through their participation in the creation of our constitu-
tional culture.
96
Unlike Post, Balkin melds the constitutional culture with the 
constitutional canon.  Because of this conflation, it is unclear what 
makes constitutional law—as opposed to constitutional culture—open 
to the influence of lay persons. Nor does Balkin specify what allows 
constitutional law to be “disturbed by social movement activism and 
day-to-day politics” in the production of a new constitutional common 
sense.
  
97  As a result, Balkin’s theory of framework originalism,
98 even 
as reinforced by Sandy Levinson’s “protestant constitutionalism,”
99
Balkin certainly attempts to incorporate lay judgments in the mix 
in a way that explains their force.  However, why one movement or 
one set of actors might have more impact than others is unclear.  We 
recognize that he is not talking about the kinds of influence that are 
justified by rational choice theory, but the mechanism of influence is 
subsumed within his definition of culture.  He acknowledges the po-
tential diversity within a constitutional culture, but he asserts rather 
than explains the nature of the dynamism he has in mind.
 
seems to focus primarily on the subculture of legal professionals (in-
cluding judges, lawyers, and legal scholars).  While social movement 
activists who seek to influence and remake the constitutional culture 
are given a place, we do not get to hear their voices as they tell their 
own stories. 
100
 
distribution of different views . . . .  It is dynamic . . . [and] [i]t features many different 
subcultures, including professional and lay opinion, and the views of people both in and 
out of the mainstream of public life.”). 
  
  95.  BALKIN, supra note 2, at 178.  
  96.  See, e.g., id. at 23–24 (noting that democracy involves social input, rather than simp-
ly a “fair legal process,” and that Balkin’s idea of culture “include[s] both legal rights and 
institutions as well as cultural predicates for the exercise of those rights and institutions”).   
  97.  Id. at 178. 
  98.  See supra Part I. 
  99.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text (describing the theory of “protestant con-
stitutionalism”); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (1988) (explain-
ing that a protestant approach to interpreting the Constitution is based on “the legitimacy 
of individualized (or at least nonhierarchical communal) interpretation”).  
  100.  See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 2, at 179 (“[P]rofessional judgments about constitu-
tional law are usually affected—sometimes quite strongly—by lay judgments about what  
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It was in an effort to put “we the people” back into the conversa-
tion that we developed the idea of “demosprudence.”
101  We coined 
the term as a critique of lawmaking that is historically preoccupied 
with moments of social change as if they occur primarily within an 
elite enterprise.  Demosprudence—like Post and Siegel’s democratic 
constitutionalism—seeks to provide a much thicker account of how 
social movements influence law, especially in times of social crisis.
102
Demosprudence is a philosophy, a methodology, and a practice 
that views lawmaking from the  perspective of informal democratic 
mobilizations and disruptive social movements that serve to make 
formal institutions, including those that regulate legal culture, more 
democratic.  Although democratic accountability as a normative mat-
ter includes citizen mobilizations organized to influence a single elec-
tion, a discrete piece of legislation, or a judicial opinion, demospru-
dence focuses on popular, purposive mobilizations that seek 
significant and sustainable social, economic, and/or political change. 
In short, we use the term demosprudence to mean the jurisprudence 
of social movements.
  
103
By social movements we mean an organized effort to make moral 
claims based on a constructed collective identity and public action.  
Social movements are different than interest groups or political or-
ganizations because they usually make their claims in ways that are 
more dynamic, contentious, and participatory than the usual interest 
group or civic association.  As Balkin notes, social movements are im-
portant because they shift “the boundaries of the reasonable, and the 
plausible” and thus “open up space for new forms of constitutional 
imagination and new forms of constitutional utopianism, both for 
good and for ill.”
 
104
 
the Constitution means or should mean . . . because what legal professionals consider rea-
sonable or unreasonable in legal argument is inevitably influenced by what the nonlawyers 
whom they live and interact with think about morals, politics, and the meaning of Ameri-
ca.”). 
  The most important thing that social movements 
do, therefore, is to alter “the sense of what is practically possible and 
  101.  See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of “demo-
sprudence”). 
  102.  See Post & Siegel, supra note 31, at 379–80 (discussing “democratic constitutional-
ism” and its consideration of social crises).  
  103.  See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 
89 B.U. L. REV. 539, 545 n.39 (2009) (quoting LANI  GUINIER  &  GERALD  TORRES, 
CHANGING THE WIND: THE DEMOSPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (forthcom-
ing) (manuscript on file with the authors)). 
  104.  BALKIN, supra note 2, at 11.  Balkin includes political movements, not just social 
movements, in his analysis.  Id.  
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the sense of what it is possible to imagine.”
105  Building on the Robert 
Cover observation with which we began this Essay, we would modify 
Balkin’s effort to reflect the important role that social movements 
play in constructing the constitutional imaginary.  It is the energy and 
the optimism of social movement activists, including lay people as well 
as legal professionals, who show us that the “what might be” is as im-
portant as the “is” and the “ought.”
106
Demosprudence seeks to put the “popular” back into popular 
constitutionalism.  Balkin’s “framework originalism,” for example, 
might be more persuasive if it were more closely linked to on-the-
ground narrative construals of social movement actors reclaiming or 
reconstructing the “constitutional imaginary.”  Social movement “juri-
sprudence,” or what we call “demosprudence,” is thus, in our view, 
crucial to Balkin’s argument.  Demosprudence helps Balkin’s argu-
ment by explaining how the actions of otherwise disenfranchised 
members of the political community, such as black people living in 
the rural South during the 1960s, for instance, make it impossible for 
doctrines such as “interposition” to be taken seriously as a statement 
of constitutional argument.
 
107
We agree with Elizabeth Beaumont, for example, when she says 
that the voices of political activists and the arguments of engaged citi-
zens are too often edited out, and the constitutional arguments 
emerging from social movements are either commonly misappro-
priated or ignored because of a thin understanding of the idea of 
popular sovereignty.
 
108
 
  105.  Id. 
  As Beaumont writes, “If popular constitutio-
  106.  Cover, supra note 1, at 10. 
  107.  Compare Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 
VA. L. REV. 7, 109 (1994) (“[L]egislators from various southern states traveled to Virginia 
to learn about interposition and school closure techniques”), with Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr., I Have a Dream, Address at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (August 
28, 1963) (“I have a dream that one day down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its 
governor having his lips dripping with the words of ‘interposition’ . . . little black boys and 
black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls as sisters and 
brothers.”).  We see this claim being raised in the current iteration of “our federalism,” 
which suggests that states should be able to declare federal laws and judicial decisions un-
constitutional.  See, e.g., Torres, supra note 29, at 546 (stating that the obligations of the 
government to the people are expressed through discussions of federalism as “fundamen-
tal limitations on the powers of the states that continue to animate current constitutional 
discourse”).  
  108.  Elizabeth Beaumont, Reviving the Public Face of Constitutional Rights: Abolition as a 
Constitutional Project, at 7 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.polisci. 
umn.edu/assets/pdf/Beaumont-PTColloq10-08.pdf (“We rarely hear the ideas, voices, or 
competing constitutional claims emerging from engaged citizens or those participating in 
social movements.  There has been inadequate attention to the constitutional arguments, 
deliberations, and actions in which many aroused citizens participate.”).  
1070  MARYLAND LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 71:1052 
nalism is to be more than a mirage that flickers and disappears on 
approach, we need a thicker account of the role of the People in 
shaping constitutional meaning and practice.”
109
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
For Balkin, constitutional faith becomes a redemptive force that 
will somehow be backed by a more robust form of constitutional poli-
tics.
110  Progressive activists, such as Martin Luther King, Jr., complete-
ly agree with Balkin.  In his speech at the March on Washington in 
1963, Dr. King declared: “When the architects of our republic wrote 
the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of In-
dependence, they were signing  a promissory note to which every 
American was to fall heir . . . .  Now is the time . . . to make justice a 
reality for all of God’s children.”
111  Here, Dr. King directly invoked 
both our common heritage and the language of religion to bind us 
together.
112  Additionally, it is important to remember that the famous 
“I Have a Dream” speech was delivered at the culmination of one 
stage of the struggle to give meaning to the Civil War Amendments 
and at the uncertain beginning of its next phase.
113
In our view, it is not the iconography but rather the blood and 
guts of political struggle that make Dr. King’s dream now seem  as 
though it were an inevitable reality.  That the mechanism necessary to 
produce such a power shift in constitutional interpretation is a project 
  
 
  109.  Id. at 8. 
  110.  BALKIN, supra note 2, at 10–11 (stating that the Constitution may only succeed and 
“be redeemed” if the people and political movement support its advancement and have 
“faith in the processes of constitutional construction over time”). 
  111.  King, supra note 107. 
  112.  Dr. King consistently fused religious metaphor with legal claims.  For example, in 
his first speech at the Holt Street Baptist Church regarding the Montgomery bus boycott, 
Dr. King said:  
[Y]ou know, my friends, there comes a time when people get tired of being 
trampled over by the iron feet of oppression . . . .  If we are wrong, the Su-
preme Court of this nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution of the 
United States is wrong.  If we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong.  If we are 
wrong, Jesus of Nazareth was merely a utopian dreamer that never came down 
to Earth.  If we are wrong, justice is a lie.  Love has no meaning.  And we are 
determined here in Montgomery to work and fight until justice runs down like 
water, and righteousness like a mighty stream. 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address to MIA Mass Meeting at Holt Street Baptist Church 
(Dec. 5, 1955). 
  113.  See Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., I’ve Been to the Mountain Top, Address at Bishop 
Charles Mason Temple (April 3, 1968) (supporting the idea that the Poor People’s Move-
ment included more than just black people).  This was Dr. King’s last speech, in Memphis, 
Tennessee, the day before he was assassinated.     
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shaped by ordinary citizens is less clear in Balkin’s account, yet evi-
dence for this truth is everywhere to be seen.
114  A cardinal example 
of movement activism, demonstrating the indissoluble nature of so-
cial, political, and legal influences, occurred when 50,000 black citi-
zens of Montgomery, Alabama, refused to ride city buses for over a 
year to eliminate the indignity of privately enforced public rules go-
verning segregation.
115
We suggest, therefore, that progressives might do better de-
emphasizing constitutional faith and, instead, developing more politi-
cally instrumental approaches to changing the way the Constitution’s 
text is interpreted.  In other words, members of a democratic political 
community should, of course, be free to interpret the constitutional 
scripture without formal guidance from an infallible oracle, but it is in 
their actions that they will find their meaning. 
  
There is a semi-permeable membrane between elite actors and 
non-elite actors, and between the judiciary and non-judicial actors.  
All of the action, in our view, is contained in the tension between 
those parts of our broader culture and the constitutional culture.   
Many important constitutional moments occur when the judiciary ef-
fectively assimilates social movement interpretation by converting it to 
a doctrinal form.
116  Greater elaboration of the interpretive process 
would reveal both the power of ordinary people to change constitu-
tional meaning and the mechanism by which elites domesticate 
threatening popular interpretations.  When social movement activism 
is defanged by virtue of its co-optation by elites, the movement energy 
is redirected not because the movement activists may have prevailed 
but because of the widely held belief that politics, especially funda-
mental political struggle, can be reduced to questions that law can re-
solve.
117
 
  114.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2064–65 (2002) (identi-
fying the civil rights, women’s rights, and gay rights movements as three key examples of 
ordinary citizens shaping constitutional interpretation). 
    
  115.  MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? 
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